Literature and Psychology

The News Letter of the Conference on Literature and Psychology of the Modern Language Association

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Leonard F. Manheim, Editor
Eleanor B. Manheim, Associate

Editorial Address:
Dept. of English, The City College of New York
117 Main Building, 139th Street & Convent Ave.
New York 31, New York

STEERING COMMITTEE FOR 1955
Leon Edel, New York University, Chairman
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Lore C. Kraus, Editorial Assistant

> Hay opinión que no vamos a estos convites [the witches' sabbaths] sino con la fantasiá, en la cual nos representa el demonio las imágenes de todas aquellas cosas que después contamos que nos han verdaderamente vamos en cuerpo y en ánima; y entrambas opiniones tengo para mí que son verdaderas, puesta que nosotras no sabemos cuándo vamos de una o de otra manera, porque todo lo que nos pasa en la fantasía es tan intensamente, quo no hay que diferenciarlo de cuando vamos real y verdaderamente.
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> --Cervantes, from El Coloquio de los Perros, in Obras Completas (Madrid, 1943), I, 980

Since the Conference on Literature and Psychology will conduct its meeting this year for the purpose of discussing the three papers which will be presented at the permanent Discussion Group on Literature and Society (General Topics 6), we are publishing in this issue the preliminary texts of those three papers, kindly submitted to us in advance by the three invited speakers. Professor Leon Edel will be chairman of both meetings.

We once again remind our subcribers that, if they wish to attend the Conference in person, they are required by MLA rules to inform Professor Edel (New York University, New York 3, N. Y.) of that fact in advance. No such notice is, of course, required of MLA members who wish to attend the meeting of General Topics 6.

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*This issue of LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY is made up at George Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville, Tennessee, and is distributed from that address.

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Tentative Agenda of the
SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY
to be held at the Meeting of the Modern Language Association of America on Tuesday, December 27, 1955, from 2:00 to 3:30 p. m., in Room 8, The Palmer House, Chicago, Illinois,

for the purpose of discussing

papers to be delivered at the meeting of General Topics 6 (Literature and Society) on Tuesday, December 27, 1955, from 11:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., in the Red Lacquer Room of the Palmer House.

[NOTE: The dates, times, and places have been taken from the tentative program of the MLA Meeting. It is believed that they will be correct at the time of the meeting, BUT ALL THOSE WHO ATTEND ARE URGED TO CONSULT THEIR PRINTED PROGRAMS in Chicago in order to verify time and place.]

It is suggested that since the two meetings will be held, respectively, before and after the luncheon interval on the same day, members of the Conference who attend the Group meeting may find it possible to lunch together between meetings. No formal arrangements for such a luncheon have been made, however.

1. Continuance of Organization

Question: Shall we continue the meetings of a group to discuss the interrelationships between literature and psychology in the form of an annual Conference or, alternatively, as a Discussion Group, if the latter is approved by the officers of MLA?

2. Permanent Organization

If it is the wish of those present, the Chairman will entertain a motion that a nominating committee be appointed from those in attendance, to present a ticket for chairman, secretary, editor, associate editor, and steering committee for 1956, for election by those in attendance at the close of the meeting.

3. Discussion of the Conference Papers

The chairman will present the authors of the three papers. There will be no formal reading or presentation of these papers, however, since it will be assumed that those in attendance will have heard the papers presented at General Topics 6 or will have read them in LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY, or both. Discussion will be opened by questions and answers among the authors themselves, to be followed by questions and statements from the floor. Each speaker will be limited to four minutes in all. Members who cannot attend may submit brief statements which will be read or smmarized by the Secretary.

4. Other Discussion

Discussion from the floor, if time permits, on the contents of recent issues of LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY and on general topics, in the order named.

5. Recommendations

Shall the publication of LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY be continued under the auspices of the Conference? Are there any suggestions for its future form, content, or financing? Shall there be a specific topic for the next annual meeting, if any?

6. The Election

Slate to be presented by the nominating committee, if No. 2 above is approved, or by nominations from the floor.

Officers for the 1955 Meeting

Chairman: Leon Edel
Secretary-Editor: Leonard F. Manheim
Associate Editor: Eleanor B. Manheim

Steering Committee: Carvel Collins
William J. Griffin
Simon O. Lesser

LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY:

A Question of Significant Form

If they are sister-disciplines, psychology and literature are jealous sisters; and so far as that jealousy is founded on an impulse to order the same or similar materials in different ways and to different ends, I cannot help thinking it a healthy jealousy, one which I wouldn't for the world seek to temper or mitigate. Literature is not watered-down psychology; psychology is not methodized literature. There is an abyss here; we must not forget it. The chief offender in this regard has usually been the critic with psychological angles to exploit—most ruthless of villians. His gift resolves itself in treating literature as a symptom, not as an art. Literature on these terms is "nothing but" psychology wearing a more or less revelatory mask; and when

the critic has stamped War and Peace or Paradise Lost with one bit of psychological jargon or other, he has defined its ultimate, and most significant, form. A pearl is "nothing but" an itch on an oyster.

No doubt crudities of this character are partly responsible for a certain drawing-together and setting-apart of literary theory which has been noted of recent years, a tendency to define the esthetic effect in strictly esthetic terms, to rally round the term "catharsis" almost as the wavering standard of a tottering monarchy. Here, at least, we may be safe, if only for a moment, from the remorseless libido, the endless erosion of impure and deceitful motives. But though my loyalties in this warfare are perfectly clear and perfectly ruthless--I would cheerfully see all the world's psychologists boiled in oil if that were the only way to preserve man's freedom to write an unselfconscious sonnet--I can't help feeling that things have not yet reached so pretty a pass, or impasse. Disregarding many of the broader aspects of my topic, I should like to plead on this occasion that not all literary works do aim at a catharsis, that some, deliberately or otherwise, include a secondary or tertiary meaning, in unresolved conflict with the major meaning; and to suggest that with works of this special character, psychology and criticism may fruitfully cooperate in defining the quality of the work's effect and even in assessing its achievement. For if the best definition we can establish of a work's subject-matter includes a latent meaning of the author's which conflicts in some considerable degree with his overt meaning, I do not see how we can decline to judge the work as a unity somewhat larger than its strictly literary form.

Before going further on this rocky polosyllabic path, let me pause a moment to define and make my terms explicit. By "psychology" I clearly don't intend to limit myself to depth psychology or the psychology of the unconscious. So far as I limit the term, it is by holding primarily in mind when I use it that particular aspect of psychology which is concerned with man as a symbol-making and symbol-using animal. In other words, I think that psychology is most useful to the critic of literature when it verges most closely on the miscellaneous disciplines of communication. And by "literary form" I mean an arrangement of words, ideas, and feelings designed to create an effect on an audience. It is no part of my argument to urge that this effect should be narrowly or in any way peculiarly conceived; indeed, the more subtly, freely, and capaciously it is conceived, the better the criticism--I won't say, the better the text. But "literary form" in its present limited definition clearly relates to only one of several rather complicated impulses within the literary creator. He wants to impress an audience, true; but he often wants to do several other things as well, things which may or may not harmonize perfectly with the demands of his literary form. A great artist will no doubt take fantastic pains to coordinate his own impulses to expression, the tendencies of his subject matter, and perhaps his awareness of the moral prepossessions of his audience (my three factors are selected more or less at random). But, for all his greatness, he may be unable or unwilling to control vast and notably disparate elements into a perfect literary form; he may, for example, want to make the point that some problems are ultimately insoluble, or he may value inclusiveness or sheer magnitude above neatness and unity. Moreover, the sort of impression he wants to make on the audience may sometimes include a critical awareness on the audience's part of his own impression-creating.

So that the "literary form" of a work may be but one element in a rather complicated process of making and receiving impressions; the work is then better judged in relation to the total process which produced it than to a single aspect of that process. In other words, the literary form is not invariably the most significant form. A specific example of this rather abstruse point is provided by Milton's Paradise Lost.

Discounting for the moment those whose chief interest in the poem is its organ-music, Paradise Lost has been read in two radically different ways; either with the figure of Satan at its center, a figure of splendid heroism and all-but-invincible energy; or with Satan as a figure of absurdity on the very outskirts of a main action dominated by God, the Son, and Adam. There are logical and illogical corollaries of each view; to investigate even a few would require more time and space than this paper can afford. But the consequences of the Satanic dichotomy will suffice to illustrate our main point. Taking the poem with Satan as a central figure, we have a set of splendid, rebellious fragments embedded in a dull, dutiful moral lecture. Taking it with Satan on the outskirts, we have a large, well-proportioned, but chilly architecture, with the most moving and heroic passages in the poem reduced to the status of irrelevant tinsel glamor. By diminishing Satan, we diminish the whole poem; by allowing him to assume the proportions he seems to demand, we throw the poem radically out of balance. The difficulty is, perhaps, less with Satan than with God and the forces of good, who generally seem totally inadequate to balance the tremendous impact and energy of Satan. In a particular way, we are evidently dealing here with that general disparity which has been variously described as a "discrepancy between Milton's pictorial and conceptual thinking" (Sypher, Four Stages of Renaissance Style, p, 195), or as the dissolution of a mystical union of Christ and man as head and body "into the exterior and quite unmystical image of the leader and the led, the captain and the broken ranks." (M. M. Ross, Poetry and Dogma, p. 190.) Some of this discrepancy or dissolution may be due to peculiarities in the intellectual materials available to Milton. Circumstance may have supplied him with a more persuasive heap of images than of ideas; certainly the frantic search of the 17th century for the visible church allowed him no comfortable convictions as to a mystical union. No doubt, too, some of the ideas on which he relied, and which were in the 17th century so sound and solid as scarcely to need articulating (for example, the notion of the hierarchic universe), have since faded out of common acceptance. And the fact is that Milton as a poet had an unusual tendency to the imperfectly reconciled opposition, the ambivalent feeling; there are examples enough to make this point evident in the poem "On the Morning of Christ's Nativity," in Comus, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes. At all events, and whatever the cause, the existence of a discrepancy between two ways of reading Paradise Lost, a discrepancy wide enough to invite the adjective "incompatible," can scarcely be denied. Under the circumstances, no alternative is more appealing than to follow Professor Tillyard in distinguishing a conscious (overt) and unconscious (latent) meaning in the poem, both of which Milton meant alike, if not equally, nor in quite the same way; and to declare unabashedly that "the subject of Paradise Lost" --at least for the cosmopolitan modern reader--"is the true state of Milton's mind when he wrote it." Its form, in other words, its most significant form, is neither its conscious discursive ideas nor the bundles of thought and feeling compacted in its images, but its intentions, logically disparate but psychologically complimentary, which both ideas and images imperfectly represent,

and which constitute a unity more significant than any which the purely literary form of the poem was able to realize.

Indeed, Professor Tillyard's point is good enough to be pushed a bit further. All works of literary art, one might say, not just Paradise Lost, communicate at several levels, not just at two. For a particular given work or a particular reader, these levels might be arranged in order of viability. All levels of communication are significant, though not to all readers. But when, for reasons of history or auctorial psychology, one channel ceases to be effective, readers are not only permitted but obliged to shift to another. The modern reader's troubles with Paradise Lost are many. Some I can relate to a changing intellectual framework, some to a changing emotional climate, some to distinctively Miltonic peculiarities which made him, even in his own time, one of the lonelies of English literature. Many of these difficulties can be met by the traditional resources of scholarship--study of the Miltonic background, careful reading of the Miltonic text, enlightened and imaginative sympathy with the Miltonic circumstances. But for anything like total communication, I find that these difficulties drive me deep into the psychologic substructure, or out onto the psychological fringe, of the poem. "A monument to dead ideas," said Sir Walter Raleigh, describing Paradise Lost better than fifty years ago; despite scholarly efforts to revamp Milton's theology, the religious meaning of Paradise Lost remains, for most modern readers, irresistibly, stone-cold dead. Not only so; the poem is a monument to dead, or at least moribund feelings, too. Not only the feeling of devoted obedience to a moral law laid down from above, but the feeling of individual heroism--these are sentiments which our society and our literature largely lack, and of which our own best wisdom teaches us to be suspicious. Concealed superego, libido inflated to heroic proportions--why should we accept either as a motive to action? The very image of a big fight between God and the Devil serves poorly indeed to express the moral issues of the modern cosmos--those involved, say, in the problem of finding a moral direction, or in society's relation to the individual. Most people no longer think in sweeping absolutes like Good and Bad, Right and Wrong, or, for that matter, Reason and Passion; the problems are hard enough in their own manipulative selves, without battalions of abstract nouns ranged around them. And yet it's impossible to doubt that much of Milton's overt meaning--unlike that of a poet like Shakespeare--is bound up with these edifying abstractions. The only solution is to read the poem for a less explicit, and so less disturbing, meaning. I don't mean that the ideology disturbs me, but that it disturbs the poem.

The meaning which the poem communicates most energetically to me is a psychological one. I can best define it as the experience of an energetic, learned, and determined mind in controlling and ordering a fragmentary world. Mastery and domination of intractable materials--this is the great theme of Paradise Lost, as it is the poem's great achievement. This is what moves us in Satan's triumph over Chaos, in God's creation of the world, in the victory of Adam and Eve over themselves. Within the poem, Chaos is a more bitter, a more ultimate enemy, than Satan himself; circumvented in Books I-IV, he rears a threatening head in VI, is expelled in VII, but returns with Protean versatility to color the whole last part of the epic. He is a comic, disorderly deity, a constant threat to Milton's command over his own poem, an ally now of God and now of Satan, but ultimately opposed to both great empires. Neither

God, Satan, nor Milton is ever quite secure from the threatening inroads of Chaos; but the magnitudes and speldors with which Chaos is opposed have a permanent impact. Whoever we are, whatever our specific problems, until we define ourselves as permanent Betas in an immutable Brave New World, we shall be struggling against Chaos, within ourselves and without.

It would be idle to pretend that reading Paradise Lost as the record of a fluctuating battle waged between an athletic, irresistibly energetic mind and an enormous mass of intractable materials represents an ideal procedure. One wouldn't do it if one didn't have to; and there are no doubt readers (like Mr. C. S. Lewis, or Professor Bush) who don't have to transpose Milton out of the dialect of Christian humanism because they have accepted in propria persona the greater part of his intellectual presuppositions and are willing to sacrifice anything in the poem which conflicts logically with these presuppositions. But such readers are rare these days, if not unique, as Mr. Lewis himself often protested; and, if they don't have to transpose Milton, that fact alone indicates that they must have to transpose other poets into the psychological lingua-franca. Will the critic who insists on reading Milton with due respect for his overt subject-matter be just as insistent--and to what sort of esthetic effect--when it comes to reading Yeats or Lucretius? And isn't the ultimate result of such extravagant literalism the conversion of the reader into a sort of esthetic chameleon, whose intellectual coloration depends on the book he happens to be holding in his hand?

The argument touches here on the problem of belief in literature, a complex and tangled topic. Everyone agrees that a reader can gain pleasure from a literary work based on ideas which the reader does not, literally, accept as ture. We need not be Catholics while reading Dante, pagans while we read Sophocles, and Theosophists when we pick up Yeats. Mr. Eliot has tried to limit critical charity in this regard--and to exclude Shelley from the bounds of this charity--by saying that the reader asks of an author's philosophy only that it be coherent and mature. But even this is too demanding, or demanding in the wrong way. Yeats' thinking was neither coherent nor, if the word has any meaning in this context, mature. Yet the poetry he wrote is unmistakably great; and we need not be Theosophists, or, indeed, know very much about that dreary disordered work A Vision, in order to appreciate "Byzantium." For Yeats' thought, though it was neither coherent nor mature, was extraordinarily transparent; a human meaning shines, and was intended to shine, through its accumulation of gyres, cycles, and phases. Milton's ideology was neither so transparent nor so clearly intended to be seen through; but the criterion in both cases is not the author's intent, it is the reader's convenience. I don't myself think it quite a coincidence that the three most thoroughly protestant poets of English, Milton, Blake, and Yeats, should all have embodied their moral light in myths which invite that procedure of reading in depth which I can best describe as "transposition." They all had their troubles with the central doctrine of Incarnation; their pictorial devices and their conceptual thinking were in a state of permanently uneasy imbalance. But whether they are protestant, Catholic, or pagan, many authors present the same problem to the reader. One cannot today read Lucretius to learn the literal structure of the universe, or Sir John Davies to learn anatomy. One may still read Dr. Johnson to learn of the armed resistance of the stoic heart, or Shakespeare to see anatomized the pangs of jealousy. But

these are more or less permanent topics; they are overt and accessible. Psychology here has its own interests in the subject-matter but the literary work is largely viable without its interventions. When the overt topic has ceased to be accessible, we may properly look for a level of communication, be it latent or indirect, which is accessible.

In effect, we read a literary work not to agree or disagree with the ideas expressed in it, but to widen our sympathies and exercise our attitudes by understanding what it feels like to view the world in a certain way, to see life from a certain angle. In this sense, the subject of every literary work is really the state of the author's mind at the moment of composition; but we are apt to be aware of this definition of the subject chiefly in the measure that we feel dissatisfied with the overt subject or the author's treatment of it. Sometimes, indeed, a distinction between overt subject and latent subjects is not profitable at all, because the levels are so closely fused as to be practically identical. It is an unusual and very lucky work of art which can sustain such a harmony over the centuries, under the thousand-faceted scrutiny of a huge reading public. It is a very inadequate esthetic theory which predicates as universal what is actually exceptional and rare.

What, then, of significant form? I suppose it is nothing more than the form which, on the best terms we can manage, gives us most grounds for sympathy, which makes possible the most intense and active cooperation between the reader's imagination and the literary work. Such a definition is pragmatic; it implies major and as yet unexplored differences between literary works; it opens a gap between one reader's experience of the literary work and another's. These are major problems, though not insoluble ones; no doubt psychology has many things to say about the ways to solve them. But this paper will have done enough if it suggests nothing more than the need for examining critical presuppositions with an eye both to the work and to the audience, between which the theory is to mediate. Both work and audience are variable; we gain only Procrustes' simplicity by imposing a single formula on their relation.

Robert Martin Adams
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE WRITER: THE CREATIVE PROCESS

As students of literature interested in learning what psychoanalysis has to tell us about the creative process and how we can use it, we find ourselves confronted at the outset by the assertion of Sigmund Freud that

> the layman may perhaps expect too much from analysis...for it must be admitted that it throws no light upon the two problems which perhaps interest him most. It can do nothing towards elucidating the nature of the artistic gift, nor can

> it explain the means by which the artist works--artistic technique.[1]

In his study of Leonardo da Vinci, accordingly, Freud was careful to define his aims so that the specific matters of artistic gift and artistic technique were excluded. He was attempting only, he said,

> to take the inter-relations between the impressions of the artist's life, his chance experiences, and his works, and from them to construct his constitution and the impulses at work in it--that is to say, that part of him which he shared with all men.[2]

This seems to imply that psychoanalysis has only incidental generalities to offer us, but fortunately that is not the case. Freud wrote these words in 1925; since then the development of psychoanalytic ego psychology has been rapid. It has now reached a stage where it knows a few things about creative mental activity which were previously considered unknowable, and it is evolving means of finding out even more. Freud himself did not always feel bound by the limitations he prescribed in Leonardo study, and on several other occasions he ignored them. His followers are even bolder. Encouraged by the noteworthy results which they have already produced, they promise to extend the psychoanalytic frontier still further. The kinds of questions they are asking themselves about art are remarkably like our own, as can be seen in the following excerpts from a list of psychoanalytic problems which are seriously being proposed for investigation:

> To what extent does a correlation exist between clinical psychological data and works of art? Are there certain types of personality in which such correlations exist and others in which they do not? What factors stimulate or hinder these correlations? What is the effect of analytic treatment, biographical events, life circumstances? Is there any correlation between certain forms of creative expression and specific forms of neurosis or psychosis? If so, can schematic descriptions, like personality types or profiles be evolved? Is it possible to prognosticate the emotional development of the artist from an examination of his work? Can his personality be thus evaluated?...What differentiation, if any, is there between neurotic symptom and artistic production? When, how, and in what form do motivations other than purely psychological needs produce artistic expression? How do they influence its value? Is it possible to work out a specific characterology to explain why certain personalities choose certain mediums and not others, why their manner of expression

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1. Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Study (London, 1948), p. 119. First published in 1925.
2. Ibid.

> is rigid or fluid, why and how they develop a certain style? ...Is there any fundamental difference between the original creation of the artist and the creative re-creation of the appreciative and understanding audience? How much does knowledge help or hinder creation and appreciation? Are creation and appreciation essentially the same act...or something qualitatively different?...In what specific manner does art serve its function of sharing an emotional and mental experience without falling prey to vulgarization and deterioration into the conventional which requires no recreative effort of the consumer?...What is, in the artistic sense, deep, characteristic, typical?[3]

Partial answers to some of these questions exist and, in fact, have already been of help to students of literature. This information falls into great classes corresponding to the two important stages in the development of psychoanalysis. The first stage, concerning itself with the ultimate psychic sources of behavior, discovered that the creations of the artist had their roots in the same experiences to which all of us are subjected by reason of our being human. For a time psychoanalysis emphasized the universal in each of us. Even after it went on to other discoveries, the lay public, including students of literature, remained fascinated with this aspect of its work to the extent that many people are still unaware that anything further has taken place.

The chief uses to which psychoanalytic information from this stage has been put in our work are the study of themes in literature, the analysis of literary symbols in psychological terms, the deduction of the author's unconscious motivation from evidence appearing in his writings, and the application of such material to the study of his life. The chief results have been to confirm psychoanalytic findings with only slight gains in our understanding of literature. It is something to know that many of the great works which move us profoundly derive part of their power from some variant of the Oedipal theme; that certain symbols have, besides their surface meaning, an unconscious significance; that some of an author's psychic problems find their way into his books without his knowing it. It is something, but it is not enough. As long as our psychoanalytic knowledge remains on this level we must continue unsatisfied. We are blocked by Freud's disclaimer, and there seems to be no way around it.

A way, however, is beginning to appear, or rather to become known to us, for cultural lag still operates. From the earliest days of psychoanalysis Freud was already seeing greater possibilities than those mentioned here. Once sufficient basic research had been done, the development of psychoanalytic ego psychology became possible, and the second great stage of psychoanalysis was inaugurated. We may date the transition in the years 1920 and 1923 when Beyond the Pleasure-Principle and The Ego and the Id, respectively, made their appearance. If we recall that Freud's study of Leonardo was written in 1910,

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3. Frederick J. Hacker, "On Artistic Production," in Explorations in Psychoanalysis (New York, 1953), p. 136.

then his caution becomes understandable to us. We have no explanation for the fact that he never subsequently turned the full resources of ego psychology upon problems of art, but it is a fact and it has led those who relied solely upon his published works to miss the implications of this important development. Other psychoanalysts, notably Ernst Kris and his co-workers, have carried on research in some of the very problem areas which interest us most. Their investigations go beyond the point to which Freud carried the psychology of art, and they make increasing use of the ability which psychoanalytic ego psychology has of disentangling the specific from the general in order to examine some of the components of the mental processes which we call creativity.

So far, it is true, they have produced more questions than answers--which is to be expected of a new scientific direction--but the methods they are establishing and refining open up the possibility for a systematic psychological study of matters which not long ago were solely the province of aestheticians and critics. Psychologists can now ask such questions as why a writer uses a particular kind of symbolism, or why he develops a romantic rather than a classical style, or why he treats a universal theme in his personal fashion, or even why he chooses to become a writer in the first place--and they see a growing promise that at least partial answers can be obtained. This advance has already given us a fair amount of information which can be useful in our work. A few samples will illustrate.

Freud held that writers are endowed with a superior "flexibility of repression," i.e., the capacity momentarily to subject ideas to the influence of the deepest, most irrational part of the mind and, having thus gained access to otherwise unavailable material, to snatch them back before they are lost to the possibility of artistic control. If we interpret this correctly, it strikes a blow at the concept of artistic inspiration in the naive sense, that is, as something which comes from outside. The artist himself may imagine that it does, but according to psychoanalytic theory it actually originates within him and is merely experienced as though it were external. Considerable weight is thus lent, for instance, to the assertion of Dr. Samuel Johnson that a man may write at any time if he will set himself doggedly to it. In another quarter, some of the wind is taken out of the sails of those theorists who insist that the artist is a neurotic and that illness is a necessary condition of artistic achievement. What Freud says is that the artist performs a mental act which in a less well-endowed person--technically, in a person with a weaker ego--might indeed lead to neurosis or worse, but that the artist is actually stronger psychically than most men. It is this strength, among other things, which makes possible the control of mental phenomena and their development into artistic products.

Another sample: Curent psychoanalytic theory proposes the hypothesis that a portion of psychic energy may, under certain conditions, be divested of its sexual or aggressive connotations and made available for mental activity which is free of sexual or aggressive conflicts. Such "neutralization" provides much of the motive power for creative mental processes by which ideas are transmuted into forms having only the most distant connection with their origins. The artist uses such energy for the selection and ordering of his ideas not according to the dictates of the impulses which first employed it but according to the needs of his artisitc self. This immediately imposes extreme caution upon anyone who attempts to read the author's inner life from his books,

for while the material is there, the line of development is not always clear. Although it is relatively easy to trace certain ideas back to their psychic origins, it is often noticeable that the intervening steps are somewhat hazy. But it is only the accurate tracing of these steps which will yield the information we seek. It is also noticeable that such tracings, however successfull, tend to leave out the fact that the material analyzed is a work of art. In fact, since the same ultimate sources can be found in the psyche for what appears in novels, in diaries and in casual conversations, there is no value for us in such analysis beyond the demonstration that authors are human, too. On the other hand, it opens the possibility that we can advance from the general to the specific. Why did this particular author, in this particular work, choose to treat this particular subject in this particular way? At present this is a question to which no comprehensive psychoanalytic answer is available, but the concept of the conflict-free use of psychic energy shows us that a writer need not be--in his work, at least--the slave of his passions and that considerations other than psychic ones enter into the understanding of art. Biography, including extenral events, assumes more psychoanalytic importance, and the vicissitudes of social life are seen to have relevance for the creative process far beyond our previous restriction to variations of the oedipal pattern.

A third sample will be all that space allows. Ernst Kris points out that what is specific in art--and this is what interests us most--results from the operation of the higher mental processes. Creation requires both the unconscious working of the so-called secondary process and conscious artistic elaboration. The unconscious part of the mind, or rather that part of the unconscious which is repressed, is not available directly for any useful mental purpose, let alone an artistic one. This raises serious doubts about the theory, if not the practice, of the surrealists, the schools of automatic writing and drip-and-dribble painting. As far as theory is concerned, it now seems clear that they are not "tapping the unconscious" at all but the stock of preconscious ideas instead, which is another matter altogether since it involves much more rational control than they think. Furthermore, if they did achieve access to the most deeply hidden material--a feat which is almost impossible without the help of a psychoanalyst--they would find that it had no intrinsic artistic value whatever. An understanding of the repressed would have saved them from this error and Freud from the trouble of declining the honor of being their inspirer. The psychoanalytic view of the topography and operation of the mind permits us to go this far in evaluating aesthetic theory. As it is applied more and more to specific problems, we may expect further information about the creative process in individual writers and a body of knowledge which can lend itself to the construction of generalizations.

These samples indicate a few of the uses to which we can put psychoanalytic knowledge. Others are being found by an increasing number of critics and scholars. Probably the one who has made the most of psychoanalysis in his own work is Lionel Trilling. He was among the first to recognize that the logical conclusion to be drawn from Freud's view of the mind is that it is "in the greater part of its tendency exactly a poetry-making organ."[4] The poet is not suffering from a kind of aberration but, on the contrary, is raising to the

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4. Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (New York, 1950), p. 52.

highest power the mental ability which lies latent in all of us. This suggests some intriguing questions regarding the great distance between poetry today and the reading public, or, in another sphere, regarding the nature of language itself and its relation to preceived or imagined reality, both matters which affect the creative process profoundly. Trilling sees psychoanalysis whole, and it is this which underlies his ability to make sound application of it to large critical problems.

He is also able to use portions of it creatively, as he has done in extending Aristotle's cathartic theory by using Freud's explanation of the repetition-compulsion, thereby adding another dimension to our understanding of what takes place in the audience's response to tragedy. More recently Trilling has applied the insights of ego psychology to the study of the image of the writer's self, illuminating the personal and artistic struggles toward maturity of John Keats. What is important about Trilling's use of psychoanalysis is that it is not a mere matching of roughly corresponding elements from literature and psychology but a true integration of scientific facts and hypotheses with the materials of his study. What is still more important is that the literary subject stands in the center of focus while psychoanalytic insights are used not as ends in themselves but only as means to bring it into clear definition. The result is an enrichment of an already perceptive critical view.

Trilling's success points up an obvious moral. If we are to derive the greatest benefit from psychoanalysis in our study of the creative process--or any other literary problem for which it has relevance--we must keep always before us the difference between our way of looking at literature and the psychoanalyst's. Since they are not the same, this means that in order to make intelligent use of psychoanalytic findings and theories we need to understand where they came from and how they were arrived at. To put it bluntly, we must know psychoanalysis as well as we know literature and criticism.

While this is a formidable requirement, nothing less will do. We have only to look at the large number of dilletantish misreadings of psychoanalytic ideas and their unsound applications to literary problems to see the alternative. Rather than commit such inexcusable errors it would be better to avoid psychoanalysis altogether and keep to what we are sure of. When we study a writer's work we try to understand the way he saw things. If we wish to benefit from the experience of psychoanalysis then we obligate ourselves to know in the most thorough way what that experience is. It is encouraging that in recent years others besides Trilling have apparently assumed the responsibility of acquiring competence in both fields. This is a sound formula; it holds the greatest promise for the future.

Louis Fraiberg
Wayne University
Detroit, Michigan

FREUD, CONRAD, AND THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION

As members of our society, Joseph Conrad and Sigmund Freud were intensely interested in discovering what it was they belonged to. Both were especially concerned with the ills of our society. They were contemporaries, Freud the elder by a year and a half. Conrad received his Master's Certificate and captaincy in the British Maritime Service at approximately the same time that Freud received his M.D. In 1897 Freud began his admirable effort to explore his own unconscious. In 1898 Conrad wrote an impressive story about his personal self-discovery in the heart of Africa. The decades of their most original work coincided. I wish to compare briefly their respective descriptions of our society with special reference to what each man saw as the social function of religion--specifically, Christianity.

Society is necessary, Freud wrote, because man's external enemy, Nature, has superior forces.[1] With her superior forces, the elements, diseases, and the painful riddle of death, Nature rises up before us "sublime, pitiless, inexorable; thus bringing to mind our weakness and helplessness, of which we thought the work of civilization had rid us." Freud's analysis of Nature's power continues in words that well paraphrase the action of Conrad's The Nigger of the Narcissus:

> It is one of the few noble and gratifying spectacles that men can offer, when in the face of an elemental catastrophe they awake from their muddle and confusion, forget all their internal difficulties and animosities, and remember the great common task, the preservation of mankind against the supremacy of nature.

If society is difficult to endure, the state of Nature is harder, Freud said. Only the tyrant benefits if cultural prohibitions are given up. But even he--as any man--is destroyed by Nature:

> It is true that nature does not ask us to restrain our instincts, she lets us do as we like; but she has her peculiarly effective mode of restricting us: she destroys us, coldly, cruelly, callously...possibly just through what has caused our satisfaction.

Readers of Conrad's The Heart of Darkness will recall that Kurtz is destroyed through unrestrained gratification of culturally prohibited instinctual desires.

If society protects us from an external enemy so dangerously superior in force as Nature, why then among the members of society are there so many enemies of it? The answer, Freud thought, is the internal enemy: the nature of man. Man is lazy and must be forced to work in spite of the fact that in work he best discovers reality.[2] Man is childish and is reluctant to give up anti-social destructive instincts in spite of the fact that alone he cannot

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1. All references to Freud's views derive from The Future of an Illusion (1928) unless otherwise indicated.

2. Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), p. 34. Compare with Conrad on the philosophy of work in The Heart of Darkness.

successfully face Nature or the aggressiveness of other men. Thus society is necessarily coercive, and hostility towards it on the part of its members inevitable:

> It is impossible to ignore the extent to which civilization is built upon renunciation of instinctual gratification, the degree to which the existence of civilization presupposes the non-gratification (suppression, regression, or something else?) of powerful instinctual urgencies.[3]

Conrad no more than Freud ignores this truth, as the two stories already mentioned and especially his novel The Secret Agent well demonstrate.

To Freud we owe the discovery that our deepest instinctual renunciations are of incest, cannibalism, and murder. These instinctual wishes, he says, have been renounced with fair success. But this is not true in the case of the other instinctual claims:

> One notes with surprise and concern that a majority of men obey the cultural prohibitions in question only under the pressure of external force...This also holds true for those so-called moral cultural demands...innumerable civilized people shrink from murder or incest...yet do not hesitate to gratify their avarice, their aggressiveness and their sexual lusts...have no compunction in hurting others by lying, fraud and calumny as long as they remain unpunished for it.

The chief obstacle to society is the "innate, independent, instinctual disposition in man" to aggression.[4] Freud states that necessity alone, the advantage of common work, does not suffice to hold men together against the instinct of aggression. They must be bound together libidinally. Society thus presents the struggle between the instincts of death/destruction and the instincts of life/love.[5]

If society in enforcing its self-preserving cultural prohibitions inevitably creates hostility towards itself among its members, how has it coped with this destructive force? In the first place, said Freud, the internalization of cultural rules in individual citizens aids society, making supporters instead of enemies. Secondly, an heritage of ego-ideals affords group rather than individual narcissistic satisfaction. Third, art though usually heeded only by the few, may yet recall impressive numbers to the cultural ego-ideals --thus contributing to social narcissistic gratification. Additional individual solutions include the aesthetic attitude, love, Yogi-like isolation, neurotic illnesses, and the use of intoxicants.[6]

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3. Ibid.,p. 63.
4. Ibid.,p. 102.
5. Ibid.,p. 103.
6. Ibid., pp. 23-42.

But society's most powerful means of counteracting the hostility of its members has been religion--in our case the religion of Christianity. It is well known that Freud traces the genesis of the "religious illusion" to the helplessness of the infant before its parents and to the helplessness of primitive man before Nature. Out of an infantile necessity, an adult compulsion. From a personal illusion, a mass delusion.[7] The unique appeal of religion lies in its power to reconcile the individual to the hardships of Nature and the imperfections of society. But, Freud insisted, Christianity has performed its psychological function only by decrying the value of life and by promising a perfect existence after death. But what happens, Freud asked, if men refuse to believe the Christian promises of future rewards in payment for present privations? If men tolerate an imperfect society and the instinctual renunciations it demands only because a perfect society is promised with death--what will happen if they no longer believe in that future reward?

Freud's question is real, since he has no answer; it is rhetorical, since he believes that the suggested situation is already at hand. The illusion has failed, Freud said. Specifically, Christianity no longer serves as a potent illusion in European society. Art, though a powerful substitute gratification in itself, is too narrow in its appeal to take the place of religion. Philosophy in the pragmatic construction of "As If" suggested by Nietzshe, Ibsen, William James and Vaihinger will not suffice. Socialism is not an adequate substitute for religion because it is merely the modern equivalent of ancient Jewish faith and medieval Catholicism. "The works of Marx, as the source of revelation, have taken the place of the Bible, and the Koran, although they are no freer from contraditions and obscurities than these earlier holy books."[8] Well then, what can man do?

He can give up the illusion; he can educate himself and his children to reality; he can listen to the soft but persistent voice of the intellect. He has nothing to lose but his illusions; and they are lost anyway. "Life is not worth much," Freud said, "but it is all we have."[9] Certainly, he insisted, Christianity as a functioning illusion is now inadequate.

> The whole thing is so patently infantile, so incongrous with reality, that...it is painful to think...the great majority ...will never be able to rise above this view of life. It is even more humiliating to discover what a large number ...alive today...must see that this religion is not tenable, yet try to defend it inchby inch.[10]

These words are similar to those of Conrad in his letters to a friend concerning Christianity:

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7. Ibid., p. 42
8. "A Philosophy of Life," New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933), p. 246.
9. The Problem of Anxiety (1936), p. 109.
10. Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 23.

> From the age of fourteen, I disliked the Christian religion, its doctrines, ceremonies, and festivals. The most galling feature is that nobody--not a Bishop of them--believes in it....I am not blind to its services but the absurd oriental fable from which it springs irritates me. Great, improving, softening, compassionate it may be, but it has lent itself with amazing facility to cruel distortions and is the only religion which, with its impossible standards, has brought an infinity of anguish to innumerable souls--on this earth.[11]

Keeping in mind this brief sketch of Freud's description of society and the failing role played in it by Christianity, let us glance at three of Conrad's stories.

In The Nigger of the Narcissus Conrad presents a shipload of primitive, naive whites corrupted by a sophisticated, civilized black. James Wait, diseased and dying, refuses to face the painful riddle of death, refuses to accept the notion of it. He insists on waiting. The crew is demoralized by civilized egoism evading the fact of death. The Narcissus struggling in a storm is like "the lost creation." Some of the crew are arranged in the rigging in a manner resembling a huge "crucifixion." Some of the crew have their hands pierced by nails while lifting Wait up out of his "coffin" of a cabin. This activity is an almost disastrous focus upon the private egoism of the Nigger at the cost of the group's Narcissus. The bitter parody of the crucifixion and the resurrection is quite clear. It is the ship which must rise--with all the crew--not James Wait. Christianity is overtly represented by Podmore and Belfast. Podmore, the cook, is a Christian fanatic, "a conceited saint unable to forget his glorious reward, beaming with the inward consciousness of his faith." He insists on praying for the ship's immediate destruction. Belfast represents Christian benevolence; he is "as sentimentally careful of his nigger as a model slave owner." A civilized evasion of the fact of death breaks the collective ego of the crew down into private egoisms. James Wait's private lie becomes mass delusion.[12]

The social ego of the Narcissus is restored by Old Singleton, who is "Tattooed like a cannibal chief" and resembles "a learned and savage patriarch, the incarnation of barbarian wisdom." Wait's attitude towards death is that of funk. Podmore's is that of Christian fanaticism. Belfast's is that of Christian sentimentalism. But Old Singleton's attitude towards death is quiet, courageous, without illusion, non-Christian, and practical. "Are you dying?" he asks Jimmy. Wait is forced to an admission. Singleton's answer is "Well, get on with your dying." Wait dies with the word "God" on his lips; but Belfast, the Christian sentimentalist, has to urge the body, which seems to cling "with undying fear" to the ship, to go into the deep. In his evasion of the fact of death, in his insistence upon personal resurrection, Wait demoralizes the crew. Through Old Singleton's simple heroic attitude the

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11. Edward Garnett, Letters from Joseph Conrad, pp. 185, 245; the quotation is a collation of two letters.
12. Viking Portable Conrad, p. 420.

corruption of individual egoism is restored to group narcissistic satisfaction in following the ego-ideal of ship/society first, individual survival second.

In The Heart of Darkness Conrad presents the white facade and inner dark corruption of the "whited sepulchre" of Christian imperialism. Kurtz's purpose is to "wean those ignorant millions from their horrid ways." He is to report to "the International Society for the Suppression of Savage Custom." He is to be a "lower sort of apostle" who is "worthy of his hire." In the Gospels Christ specifically warns his lower apostles not to carry staves if they are to be worthy of their hire.[13] Marlow, accompanied by many "pilgrims with staves," journeys into the heart of Africa to seek the truth about Kurtz. He passes through three stations of Dante's Inferno (as I have shown elsewhere) --each station symbolizing a regression of the ego in the face of a jungle reality described in the terminology Freud uses when imaging the id.[14] Kurtz, Marlow discovers, is a real devil to the blacks. He has perverted cannibalism (which Marlow accepts as natural) into something involving "infernal rites," mutilation, torture, horror. The story is an ironic reversal of The Nigger of the Narcissus, for here is presented a civilized and sophisticated white corrupting a jungle-full of naive cannibals. The very Christian-Kurtz--representing the genius of Europe--is placed in a situation where all "external checks" are gone. And "he lacked restraint in the gratification of his various lusts." He is destroyed through Nature's irony in the manner Freud describes. Upon his return to civilization, Marlow lies to Kurtz's intended wife; he maintains the "illusion." But we need not confuse this action of Marlow's with the meaning of the story.

Kurtz's "Intended" lives in a "mausoleum" in which the piano is like a "sarcophagus" and which fronts on a street resembling "an alley in a cemetery." The city which houses this tomb is "a city of the dead." It reminds Marlow of the "whited sepulchre." It is a city of "desolation." Indeed, as I have shown elsewhere, it is Dante's "Citta Dolente," the "City of Desolation" which constitutes the Sixth Circle of the Inferno. Thus the lie Marlow tells the Intended is told to a fanatical egoistic "saint" who lives in a tomb in a dead city. The society based on the "illusion" is dead. Furthermore, Marlow distinguishes between the Intended in a dead city and the leaders of English society on the boat with him on the Thames. Finally, the narrator of the story is not Marlow. If Marlow tells a lie, the narrator--Conrad--tells the truth.

In The Secret Agent is portrayed a society which--to use Freud's phrase --is based on "suppression, repression, or something else." Each character, from nihilist to prime minister, has his secret--his taint of corruption. Behind a fake stationery shop, a fake pornography shop. Behind that, a fake secret agent. Behind him, a group of fake anarchists and a fake inspector of police. Behind Verloc as a husband, a fake wife in love only with her idiot brother, involved in a frustrated incest wish. In this novel, narcissus and the jungle move into London and no consolatory illusion appears.

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13. Luke, 9:3.

14. See "The Anatomy of the Mental Personality," New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, pp. 82-112.

The idiot Stevie's drawnings of innumerable perfect circles symbolize the various self-obsessed and mad characters. Winnie spurns a young butcher and marries Verloc who butchers her brother. The idiot's remains remind Inspector Heat of "the by-products of a butcher shop." Christianity finds its sole representative in the anarchist, Michaelis, the "Apostle." This "angelic" "saint" wishes to convert society into a huge hospital as described in his auto-biography the chapters of which are entitled "Faith, Hope, Charity." In skimming through these three works I hope the parallel I have pursued is clear. A society dependent upon a dead illusion is a society in mortal danger.

In closing I would like to place the final words of Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents next to the last lines of Conrad's The Secret Agent. Freud concludes his essay thus:

> The fateful question of the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent the cultural process developed in it will succeed in mastering the derangements of communal life caused by the human instincts of aggression and self-destruction.

Conrad ends his novel with a reference to the nihilistic Professor who has wired himself up to a load of nitroglycerine concealed under his clothes:

> And the incorruptible Professor walked...He had no future. He disdained it. He was a force. His thoughts caressed images of ruin and destruction. He walked frail, insignificant, shabby, miserable--and terrible in the simplicity of his idea calling madness and despair to the regeneration of the world. Nobody looked at him. He passed on unsuspected and deadly, like a pest in the street full of men.

We know, in spite of the novel's irony, that the Professor was neither unsuspected nor unseen by Conrad. We know too that Freud looked at this shabby little citizen--looked at him precisely, carefully, scientifically, sympathetically. In brief space I have tried to indicate how literature, as represented by Conrad, and psychology, as represented by Freud, meet--inevitably--in the common concern ultimately dearest to each: the preservation of society.

Alan M. Hollingsworth
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana

CORRESPONDENCE

From Dr. Louis Fraiberg, who attended the International Psychoanalytic Congress at Geneva, Switzerland, last summer and who reports on some of the papers of special interest to us (they are treated in the order in which they were delivered, most of them on the first day of the Congress):

Dr. Edward Hitschmann of Boston read a rambling paper entitled "Some Psychoanalytic Aspects of Biography." It offered nothing really new but summarized the progress of psychoanalytic pathography to real biography which is enhanced by psychoanalysis. This seems overly optimistic to me, not as ideal but as achievement. I see very little of it around, but I must admit that it does happen now and then. Hitschmann also mentioned the "Science of Man" and some of the problems of creative activity and production. Like Charity, "some" covers a multitude of .... This paper was in the nature of reflections by a wise and honored member of the profession, thinking out loud on a number of problems, rather than a scientific contribution.

A paper which sounded promising was squeezed out of the program for lack of time. It was "The Legend of Orestes, A Psychoanalytical Approach to the Problem of Matricide," by Dr. Walderedo de Oliviera of Buenos Aires. The author's abstract concludes that "the mythical content of Aeschylus' Oresteia represents an artistic elaboration of the most recent discoveries [of Klein] in the same way as Oedipus...was used as the paradigm for Freud's great discoveries." There is a technical quarrel behind this, with the classical Freudians objecting to the unscientific basis of Klein's "discoveries," but this is outside our sphere.

Drs. Richard and Edith Sterba of Detroit read a packed and too-short paper, "The Anxieties of Michelangelo Buonarotti." It dealt with the underlying reasons for the five occasions on which Michelangelo fled in order to evade responsibility when certain aspects of his conflicts were brought too painfully to the surface. At such times he actually left the city and fled elsewhere. The paper examined the relationship of the reasons for these flights to some of the characteristics of his art. This was well handled technically except for what seems to me an unwarranted departure from the theory of psychic energy distribution promulgated by Kris, Hartmann, and Loewenstein. However, this was a minor point. The main thing was the Sterbas' interpretation of the flights as "escapes from an unbearable conflict between aggression and guilt as well as between sensuality and inhibition." They were careful to disclaim any special knowledge of the relationship of this to his works, a caution which is commendable in lesser people but which leaves us thirsty for more when we hear it from researchers of their stature, who also know a great deal about art. (Mrs. Sterba has two Ph.D.'s, in psychology and musicology; Dr. Richard Sterba is well-informed on classical and Renaissance art.) This paper will almost certainly appear in a forthcoming issue of the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.

There was another paper of somewhat oblique interest. Dr. Edward Glover, in the course of "Psycho-Analysis and Criminology," took occasion to reiterate his very high scientific standards and to urge utmost caution in reaching conclusions in a field as complicated as psychoanalysis, particularly when it

approaches other fields having somewhat different criteria, like group psychology, sociology, and law. To this I would add our field, since everything he said was applicable to it. He mentioned particularly the problem posed by the rigid demands of science on the one hand and, on the other, the pressure of society for a solution to, say, the problem of juvenile delinquency. This is exactly parellel to our pressure for "solutions" to the problems of art--now. Verb. sap.

BIBLIOGRAPHY (XX)

Dr. Hoosag K. Gregory of the Department of Language and Literature at the Case Institute of Technology calls our attention to his dissertation:

> The Prisoner and His Crimes: A Psychological Approach to William Cowper's Life and Writings (Harvard, 1951).

Dr. Gregory would greatly appreciate receiving comments and criticisms from any members of our group as to the strengths and inadequacies (if any) of his work. The manuscript is, of course, available on inter-library loan from the Widener Library.

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Our indispensable Editorial Assistant notes a hostile review in a German-language newspaper published in New York City:

> Oskar Maria Graf, "Der psychoanalysierte Rilke," Aufbau for April 29, 1955.

The works reviewed are:

> Peter Demetz, René Rilkes Prager Jahre (Eugen Diederichs, Düsseldorf, 1954),

and

> Erich Simenauer, Rainer Marie Rilke, Legende und Mythos (Paul Haupt, Bern, 1954).

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Beacon Press of Boston announces for publication, early in 1956, in its series of Mid-Century Essays, of the 1955 Freud Anniversary Lecture delivered in May at the New York Psychoanalytic Society:

> Lionel Trilling, Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture.

Professor Trilling was the first person from outside the field of professional psychoanalysis ever to deliver one of the annual Anniversary Lectures.

The same publisher also announces the forthcoming publication of a work tangential to our field, but interesting, perhaps, to many of our members:

> Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud.

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An excellent work which should be of great value to our members,

Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Published for The Bollingen Foundation as No. XVII in The Bollingen Series by Pantheon Books, New York, 1949),

has been translated into German as

Der Heros in Tausend Gestalten (S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1953).

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Professor Max Wehrli of the University of Zürich, Switzerland (Visiting Professor at Columbia University in 1955), is the author of a work in the field of inter-disciplinary relationships:

Allgemeine Literaturewissenschaft (Wissenschaftliche Forschungsberichte, Band 3) (Zürich, 1953).

At pages 119-123 he discusses "Psychologische Erschliessung des Werkes."

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Announcing a new exchange,

The Victorian News Letter, published by the English X Group of MLA under the editorship of William E. Buckler of New York University.

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Number Seven of this News Letter (April, 1955) contains the text of

Edgar Johnson, "The Present State of Dickens Studies,"

a paper delivered at the meeting of the English X Group of MLA in December, 1954. At page 8 Professor Johnson comments on examples of psychoanalytic interpretations of Dickens.

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An example of psycho-literary criticism which suffers, it might seem, from inadequate background in psychodynamics, but which does contain an admirable collation of literary source-material on its special topic is

Ralph Tymms, Doubles in Literary Psychology (Bowes and Bowes, Cambridge, England, 1949).

The author chooses many of his examples of the phantom and realistic double from German literature of the Romantic period, singling out E. T. A. Hoffman as the author who, before Dostoevsky, achieved the most penetrating mastery of psychology in his depiction of the phenomenon. The author cites, among other references:

Max Dessoir, Das Doppel-Ich (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1896).

The psychologist Dessoir was also a literary scholar, as witness his

Dostoevsky's Letters to His Family and Friends (tr. E. C. Mayne, London, 1914).

Also cited are earlier works on the fascinating subject of the Doppelgänger:

A. Kraus, Beiträge zum Doppelgänger Motiv bei E. T. A. Hoffmann (Rostock, 1918),

W. Krauss, Das Doppelgängermotiv in de Romantik (Germanische Studien, Heft 99, Berlin, 1930),

E. Lucka, "Verdoppelung des Ich," Preussicher Jahrebücher, Vol. CXV, Berlin, 1905,

as well as:

T. Segaloff, Die Krankheit Dostejewskys (Munich, 1907)

and

P. Sucher, Les sources du merveilleux chez E. T. A. Hoffman (Paris, 1912).

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A new collection by an old friend:

Merrill Moore, A Doctor's Book of Hours, Including Some Dimensions of the Emotions (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1955).

Dr. Moore is now the subject of a full-scale biography,

Henry W. Wells, Poet and Psychiatrist: Merrill Moore, M. D. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1955).

Randall Stewart, who reviewed the work for The Nashville Tennessean on October 2, 1955, points out that the book is neither biography, criticism, nor anthology, but a combination of all three, and comments on some of the sonnets contained in it:

> Of particular interest in the present volume is the section called "Scientist as Poet," and the sub-sections, "Analysis of Love," "Analysis of Fear," and "Analysis of Death." It is in this part of the book that the reader most clearly sees the appropriateness of Mr. Wells' title "Poet and Psychiatrist."

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A welcome aid to some of our readers who are still puzzled by the varying tenets of the different schools of psychoanalysis and depth psychology might be the new book,

Ruth L. Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought. An Exposition, Critique and Attempt at Integration (New York: Dryden Press, 1955).

And finally, as a recompense for the seemingly inexhaustible mine of material which we have found in Virginia Woolf, we should mention her new biography,

Aileen Pippett, The Moth and the Star (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955).

SUBSCRIPTION LIST FOR 1955

Individuals

Mrs. Judith L. Abbott, 67-30 Dartmouth St., Forest Hills 75, N. Y.
Miss Ruth R. Adams, Baltimore Junior College, 2815 Paul St., Baltimore 18, Maryland
H. L. Auspacher, Dept. of Psychology, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont
Miss Margery Barnett, 21 King St., New York, N. Y.
Roy P. Basler, 3030 Lake Avenue, Cheverly, Maryland
Harry Bergholz, 1701 South Boulevard, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Edmund Bergler, 251 Central Park West, New York 24, N. Y.
B. E. Boothe, 721 Saline Street, Topeka, Kansas
Wayne Burns, 11332 Riviera Place, Seattle 55, Washington
Paul Brown, Dept. of English, Temple University, Philadelphia 22, Pennsylvania
Herbert Cahoon, 151 East 83 St., New York 28, N. Y.
Albert C. Cain, 414 East Washington, Ann Arbor, Michigan
Simon Certner, 1600 Metropolitan Ave., Bronx 62, N. Y.
Carvel Collins, Dept. of English, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 39, Massachusetts
Franklin D. Cooley, Dept. of English, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland
Joan Corbett, Dept. of English, Westhampton College, University of Virginia, Richmond 21, Virginia
Kenneth Craven, Dept. of English, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia
Robert B. Davis, 82 Hedges St., Tiffin, Ohio
George Bruce Dearing, Dept. of English Literature, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania
Mrs. Thomas Detre, 542 East 79 St., New York 21, N. Y.
Mrs. Esther Dichter, Bronx H. S. of Science, Creston Avenue and 187 St., Bronx 58, N. Y.
Mrs. Shirley W. Dinwiddie, 4711 Guilford Road, College Park, Maryland
Fred A. Dudley, 1821 Lake St., Pullman, Washington
Leon Edel, Dept. of English, New York University, New York 3, N. Y.
Erling W. Eng., Dept. of Psychology, Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio
Victor Erlick, Dept. of Slavic Languages, 226 Thomson Hall, University of Washington, Seattle 5, Washington

Otis E. Fellows, Dept. of French, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.
N. Bryllion Fagin, Dept. of English, John Hopkins University, Baltimore 18, Maryland
Herzl Fife, 105-43, 63rd Avenue, Queens 75, New York
Mrs. Elsa M. Fleissner, Dept. of German, Wells College, Aurora, New York
Louis Fraiberg, 18244 Parkside Avenue, Detroit 21, Michigan
William J. Ford, 605 N. Franklin Street, Dwight, Illinois
Gaston Gille, Dept. of Romance Languages, The City College of New York, 139th St. and Convent Ave., New York 31, N. Y.
David Bounell Green, Dept. of English, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania
William J. Griffin, Dept. of English, George Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville 5, Tennessee
Sybil Gultenberg, Dept. of English, Hooren High School, 59th St. and Tenth Ave., New York, N. Y.
Miss Diane Haegerty, San Francisco State College, 1600 Holloway Ave., San Francisco 27, California
John V. Hagopian, Dept. of English, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
John T. Hall, Hinton Hotel, Madison, Virginia
Horace E. Hamilton, Dept. of English, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey
Nelson G. Hanawalt, Dept. of Psychology, New Jersey College for Women, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey
S. I. Hayakawa, San Francisco State College, San Francisco 27, California
Richard M. Hazelton, Dept. of English, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey
Frank S. Hewitt, Chairman, Dept. of English and Foreign Languages, Hastings College, Hastings, Nebraska
Stanley M. Holberg, 4311 Rowalt Drive, College Park, Maryland
Lucyle Hook, 200 W. 108th St., New York 25, N. Y.
Stanley E. Hymore, Literature Faculty, Bennington College, Vermont
S. F. Johnson, 8 East 8th St., New York 5, N. Y.
Richard M. Kain, Dept. of English, University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky
Sumner Kalman, Mt. Zion Hospital, Post and Scott, San Francisco, California
Leonard F. Manheim, Poste Restante, Lausanne, Switzerland.
Mack Hanzer, 66 Park Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.
John P. Kirby, Dept. of English, Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Lynchberg, Virginia
Mary L. Kvestat, 5723 Avenue L, Brooklyn 34, N. Y.
Loie C. Kraus, 84-37, 118th St., Richmond Hill 18, N. Y.
William H. F. Lamont, Dept. of English, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey
John C. Lapp, Dept. of Romance Languages, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio
Mrs. Dorothy Lasker-Schlitt, Dept. of German, Brooklyn College, Brooklyn 10, New York
Lewis Leary, Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.
Mrs. Bess Lehrman, Dept. of English, William Howard Taft High School, 230 East 172 Street, Bronx 57, N. Y.
Simon O. Lesser, 229-12, Kingsbury Ave., Flushing 64, N. Y.
Joseph Levi, 50 W. 72 St., New York 25, N. Y.
Irving Linn, 99 Marble Hill Avenue, New York 63, N. Y.
Robert M. MacGregor, New Directions, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14, N. Y.
John McKiernan, Dept. of English, State University Teachers College, Genesec, New York

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L. Michael Manheim, Dept. of English, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware
Virgil Markham, Dept. of English, Wagner College, Staten Island 1, New York
Gustave Mathieu, Dept. of German, Box 31, Hamilton Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.
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Harrison T. Meserale, Dept. of English, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland
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Ralph N. Miller, 3524 Canterbury Avenue, Kalamazoo, Michigan
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Hoosag K. Gregory, Case Institute of Technology, 10900 Euclid Ave., University Circle, Cleveland 6, Ohio
George Mohr, 34 Monroe Place, Brooklyn 1, N. Y.
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Merrill Moore, 10 Crabtree Road, Squantum 71, Massachusetts
Henry A. Murray, Dept. of Social Relations, Harvard, 48 Mt. Auburn St., Cambridge 38, Massachusetts
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Porter G. Perrin, Dept. of English, University of Washington, Seattle 5, Wash.
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Richard Plant, 309 East 48 St., New York 17, N. Y.
Burton R. Pollin, 300 Riverside Drive, New York 25, N. Y.
John Portz, Dept. of English, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland
Joseph Prescott, Dept. of Eng., Wayne University, 475 Putnam Ave., Detroit 1, Michigan
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David M. Rein, Dept. of English, Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland 6, Ohio
William B. Reiner, 81 Ocean Parkway, Brooklyn 18, N. Y.
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Elizabeth Schneider, Dept. of English, Temple University, Philadelphia, Penna.
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Miss Eva Wolfson, 220 W. 107th St., New York 25, N. Y.
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Arthur Wormboudt, Dept. of English, State Teachers College, 121 Sixth St., So., St. Cloud, Minnesota
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